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Revocation of Consents to Adoption in Illinois:
A Proposal for Statutory Change
*JOHN L. McCORMACK
THE ILLINOIS ADOPTION STATUTE
In Illinois, natural parents, by the execution of an appropriate form,
may make their child available for adoption. The form for consent to
adoption is prescribed by statute and contains the following language:
I understand such child will be placed for adoption and that I
cannot under any circumstances, after signing this document,
change my mind and revoke or cancel this consent or obtain or re-
cover custody or any other rights over such child ....
I have read and understand the above and I am signing it as my
free and voluntary act.'
However, another section of the Illinois Adoption Act provides that
consents to adoption "shall be irrevocable" unless they are obtained by
"fraud or duress."2
The present Illinois Adoption Act expresses the legislative judgment
that the best interests of potential adoptees requires stabilization of
their environments by finalizing their availability early in the adoption
process.3 Under former Illinois law, such finalization was not possible
since consent to adoption could be revoked at any time prior to the
entry of an order of adoption.' Upon the execution of a revocation,
the child would be taken from the adopting parents and returned to
the natural parents. Consequently, the adopting parents would suffer
the anguish of losing a child they had grown to love and furthermore,
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.S.,
1964, J.D., 1968, the University of Wisconsin.
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-10 (1973).
2. Id. § 9.1-11.
3. See People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 Ill. 2d 84, 93-94, 213
N.E.2d 507, 512 (1966); In re Wojtkowiak, 14 Ill. App. 2d 344, 349, 144 N.E.2d 760,
762 (1957).
4. See In re Thompson v. Burns, 337 IMI. App. 354, 86 N.E.2d 155 (1949).
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the child would have to adjust to a new environment. Apparently,
such pre-decree revocation of consent and its negative consequences
motivated the legislature to change the law, requiring that consents to
adoption be irrevocable unless obtained by fraud or duress.'
It is submitted that the present Illinois Adoption Act has a serious
deficiency in that it does not contain adequate assurance that parents
executing consents to adoption will actually understand the finality of
their act. The only substantial assurance now provided6 is the require-
ment that the consent state that it is irrevocable. However, this as-
surance is inadequate. To inform people that certain consequences
will follow from their actions does not necessarily assure that people
grasp the significance of the consequences.' The Illinois legislature
went further in the direction of finality than was necessary to alleviate
the negative consequences caused by pre-decree revocation of consent.
The legislature, following the lead of other jurisdictions and the Uni-
form Adoption Act, could have provided that consents would be revo-
cable only at the discretion of the court upon a finding that revocation
would be in the best interests of the child." Alternatively, the legis-
lature could have provided that consents would be irrevocable only af-
ter the expiration of a brief cooling-off period.
Tennessee law incorporates both of these alternatives. In Ten-
nessee, a consent, which is called a surrender, becomes irrevocable 30
days after its execution, if given to any adoption agency. Consents
given to others become irrevocable after the expiration of 90 days.9
As added protection, Tennessee courts have the discretion to refuse
a revocation if the best interests of the child so require, even if the
attempt to revoke was exercised within the applicable time period."0
A number of commentators have argued for, and a number of
jurisdictions have adopted, a discretionary rule governing revocation of
consent."1 For example, the Wisconsin statute, taken from the Uni-
form Adoption Act, grants the court discretion to allow withdrawal of
5. H.B. 457 [1953] IIl. Laws 1481.
6. The Act also provides that consents by mothers must be taken after the expira-
tion of 72 hours from the birth. Fathers who consent before the birth of the child may
revoke the consent within 72 hours of the birth. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-9 (1973).
These provisions function to protect parents from making rash or uninformed consents.
7. See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses
in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 348 (1926).
8. See Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine
and Social Policy, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 564, 571 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-117 (Supp. 1974).
10. Id.
11. E.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 571 & n.56.
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consent "if it finds that the best interests of the child will be furthered
thereby .... -12 Of course, it is possible that the court, guided only
by the broad "best interests of the child" standard, might abuse its dis-
cretion. 13
The present Illinois rule prohibits revocation of consents to adop-
tion except when obtained through fraud or duress. This appears to
provide ample protection for both the interests of children and adopting
parents, while protecting natural parents from the loss of parental rights
through fraud or coercion. But the Illinois procedure does not contain
sufficient safeguards to impress the fact of finality of the execution of
consents on those making them. Lacking this safeguard, the statute
has produced tragic litigation in which natural parents have tried to
prove that their consents were obtained through fraud or duress.'
Since consents were made irrevocable in 1953, nine Illinois cases in
which natural parents attacked their consents to adoption on fraud or
duress grounds have reached the appellate level. In three of these
cases, the attacks were successful. 15 In these cases, the natural parents
claimed that they did not really appreciate the finality of their actions,
that they were under the mistaken idea that the waiting period between
placement and final decree was a period during which the consents
could be revoked, and finally, that their decision to consent was made
under difficult and trying circumstances. Under the influence of a be-
lief in the primacy of natural over adoptive parenthood, the judges who
decided these cases may have granted relief where they thought that
consent was mistakenly executed'6 or where their notions of justice
12. WIs. STAT. ANN. see. 48.86 (West 1957).
13. It is interesting to note that since section 48.86 was enacted in Wisconsin in 1955
and until March 1975, the date of this writing, no reported case arising under this sec-
tion has reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court (the only appellate level court in Wiscon-
sin). Apparently, the exercise of discretion by Wisconsin trial court judges in consent
revocation cases has not motivated anyone to seek appellate review. By contrast, the
Illinois statute on revocation has generated nine appellate level cases since it was enacted
in 1953; see Note 16 infra. Of course, the population difference between Wisconsin and
Illinois may in part account for the disparity.
14. At the time of the trial of Huebert v. Marshall, 132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d
464 (1971), this writer was associated with the firm of Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illi-
nois, counsel for the natural parents, the Marshalls, and was present at the trial. The
great emotional suffering being experienced by both sets of parents and some of the
other participants was readily apparent.
15. Successful attacks on consents: People ex rel. Buell v. Bell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 82,
155 N.E.2d 104 (1959); People ex rel. Karr v. Weihe, 30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 174 N.E.2d
897 (1961); and Huebert v. Marshall, 132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971).
Unsuccessful attacks on consents: In re Petition of Balota, 7 Il. App. 2d 178, 129
N.E.2d 234 (1955); In re Wojtkowiak, 14 Ill. App. 2d 344, 144 N.E.2d 760 (1957);
People ex rel. Filipowski v. Gusterine, 16 Il. App. 2d 336, 148 N.E.2d 1 (1958); In re
Simaner, 15 Ill. 2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555 (1959); Cohen v. Janie, 57 Il. App. 2d 309,
207 N.E.2d 89 (1965); and People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 Il1. 2d
84, 213 N.E.2d 507 (1966).
16. Mistake is not a ground for revocation. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (1973).
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supported revocation under the guise of applying fraud or duress con-
cepts. Thus, some judges are apt to apply rather broad concepts of
fraud and duress in order to void consents. Before looking at the three
cases, it may be helpful to review the doctrines of fraud and duress
as they are generally applied.
FRAUD AND DuREss
The various species of fraud and duress operate to void acts caused
by the conduct of wrongdoers. For his conduct to constitute actual
fraud, the wrongdoer must either knowingly misrepresent material facts
or fail to disclose material facts where he is under a positive duty to
do so. To constitute moral duress or undue influence, the wrongdoer
must apply pressure beyond morally acceptable bounds. To constitute
actual duress, the wrongdoer must apply pressure in a form prohibited
by law, forcing the subject of the pressure to take or to refrain from
action. An obvious example of actual duress is forcing someone to act
at the point of a gun. Actual duress has been defined as follows:
Duress has been universally defined as a condition which exists
where one is induced by the unlawful act of another to make a con-
tract or perform or forego an act under circumstances which will
deprive him of the exercise of his will. There must be such com-
pulsion affecting the mind as shows that the execution of the con-
tract or other instrument was not the voluntary act of the maker.
Such compulsion must be present and operate at the time the in-
strument was executed. The burden of proving such duress is on
the person asserting it. 17
The heart of the doctrine of duress is an act, or threat to perform an
act, which deprives another of his freedom of choice. In actual duress,
the act or threat must be unlawful; in moral duress, the act or threat
must be immoral or unconscionable.
Fraud has been defined as follows:
Fraud includes anything calculated to deceive, whether it be a
single act or combination of circumstances, whether the suppression
17. Stoltze v. Stoltze, 393 Ill. 433, 442, 66 N.E2d 424, 428 (1946). See also
People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 I11. 2d 84, 93, 213 N.E.2d 507, 511
(1966) ("Mere advice, argument or persuasion does not constitute duress . . . if the
individual acts freely when he executed the questioned documents though the same would
not have been executed except for the advice, argument or persuasion."); and In re
Simaner, 16 111. App. 2d 48, 52-53, 147 N.E.2d 419, 421-22 (1957) aff'd 15 Ill. 2d 568,
155 N.E.2d 555 (1959) ("Mere annoyance or vexation will not constitute duress ....
The fact alone that . . . [a person) was mentally disturbed at the time, as all . . .
[people] would be under similar circumstances, does not constitute duress."). See also
Doose v. Doose, 300 Ill. 134, 133 N.E. 49 (1921); Mills v. Forest Preserve District, 345
111. 503, 178 N.E. 126 (1931); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Gilmore, 345 Ill. 28,
46, 177 N.E. 710, 717 (1931).
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of truth or the suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct
falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of
mouth or by look or gesture. ... If fraud ,be proved, it vitiates all
transactions touched by it .... is
The term "fraud" often embraces species of constructive fraud such
as undue -influence. Acts procured by undue influence are invalidated
on the theory that such acts are not really the actor's, but are the per-
son's who is exercising the influence. 19 Advice, argument or persua-
sion do not constitute undue influence if the individual acts freely when
he performs the questioned act though such act would not have been
performed but for the advice, argument or persuasion. Also, undue
influence "may be the result of activities of third persons as well as
result of activities of the direct beneficiaries."2  Furthermore, receipt
of a benefit by one in a fiduciary relationship with another may raise
a presumption that the benefit was procured by undue influence: 21
[w]here a party stands in confidential relations to another, such as
that of a parent and child, guardian and ward, attorney and client,
priest and penitent, etc., if the dominant party receives the benefit
or donation during the existence of such relation, the party impos-
ing the confidence on seasonable application to a court of equity,
may obtain relief from the burdens and duties imposed simply by
showing the transaction and the confidential relation; the presump-
tion of the law being that as long as the relation lasts the transac-
tion is the result of undue influence, and to make the transaction
good in law there must be a severance of such relation, at least for
the time being, and the party reposing the confidence must have
competent and independent advice. In such cases the burden of
proof rests upon the party claiming the benefit under the transac-
tion to repel the presumption thus created by the law by showing
a severance of the relation, and this must be done 'by the interposi-
tion of competent and independent advice. And it is no answer to
say that the party making the donation knew the effect of it, or that
he approved the transaction, if the confidential relation be not sev-
ered by independent advice by some disinterested, competent per-
son.
22
ILLINOIS REVOCATION CASES
Buell v. Bell
The first case which arose after consents were made irrevocable in
which a natural parent succeeded in proving fraud or duress in the pro-
18. Sterling v. Kramer, 15 Ill. App. 2d 230, 236, 145 N.E.2d 757, 760 (1957).
19. Id.
20. Swenson v. Wintercorn, 92 I11. App. 2d 88, 102, 234 N.E.2d 91, 98 (1968).
21. Id. at 101, 234 N.E.2d at 97.
22. McQueen v. Wilson, 131 Ala. 606, 609-10, 31 So. 94, 95 (1901).
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curement of her consent was People ex rel. Buell v. Bell.23 Upon her
divorce, Mrs. Buell was granted custody of her four children. Ap-
proximately six months later she became pregnant. Her former hus-
band told her that she would lose the other children if she kept the
unborn child, and suggested that a former fellow-employee and his wife
would be interested in adopting the child. Apparently, Mrs. Buell
agreed to allow them to adopt the child and they agreed to pay Mrs.
Buell's medical expenses. Mrs. Buell signed the consent to adoption
two days after the birth of the child, while still in her hospital bed. She
testified that she did not read the consent and that it was not read to
her. The attorney who had given her the consent form to sign testi-
fied that he had explained it to her.
Two days after signing the consent, Mrs. Buell changed her mind. A
nurse came into the room, found Mrs. Buell in tears and told her that
there was a 6-month period in which she could reclaim her child. This
statement was repeated to Mrs. Buell on the same day by a physician
who asked of Mrs. Buell, "Who is going to pay your bills?"
The trial court found that the consent was procured by the duress
of the physician and made solely by Mrs. Buell to obtain her release
from the hospital.24 However, since the exchange between Mrs. Buell
and her physician took place 2 days after the consent was executed,
the court's reasoning is specious, since the exchange could not possibly
have caused or in any way affected the execution of the consent. The
court also determined that the comments of Mrs. Buell's former hus-
band regarding possible loss of her children were fraudulent.
The appellate court affirmed this decision. After reviewing the evi-
dence, the court placed special emphasis on Mrs. Buell's weakened
condition and need for money to pay her medical bills at the time she
signed the consent. To explain the decision, the court invoked the
doctrine of moral duress, stating that:
"[M]oral duress" consists in imposition, oppression, undue influ-
ence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial
stress or extreme necessities or weakness of another, and relief is
granted in such cases on the basis that the party benefiting thereby
has received money, property, or other advantage which in equity
and good conscience he should not be permitted to retain .... 25
23. 20 Ill. App. 2d 82, 155 N.E.2d 104 (1959).
24. Id. at 85, 155 N.E.2d at 106.
25. Id. at 95, 155 N.E.2d at 111. Apparently, the agreement to pay the medical
bills was characterized as "moral duress." It might as reasonably have been charac-
terized as "charity."
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The court's view of the case was undoubtedly influenced by a belief
that natural parents are somehow better for a child than adoptive
parents. The court said:
The rights of the petitioner, Beulah M. Buell, mother of this child,
to the custody of the child are superior to those of any other person,
when she is a fit person to have custody .... Adoption, which
affects the course of inheritance, deprives the child of the place in
which it was placed by nature, and by force of law thrusts the child
into another relationship .... 26
Perusal of a number of judicial opinions involving disputes between
natural and adoptive parents or agencies reveals that the belief in the
primacy of the rights of natural parents in their children is widely held
in the United States. 27  However, recent cases and legislation suggest
that the strength and pervasiveness of this belief is fading.28 As long
as this belief remains entrenched in the minds of the Illinois judiciary,
the tendency to overextend the concepts of fraud and duress in consent
revocation cases will persist.
Karr v. Weihe
The second case in which a consent was set aside was People ex
rel. Karr v. Weihe.29 After Mrs. Karr conceived the child, her hus-
band told her that they could not afford the baby. They went to an
adoption agency where they spoke to a clergyman. The Karrs inquired
about temporary placement. The clergyman said that temporary
placement would cost more than they could afford and suggested adop-
tion. The day following the birth of this child, Mrs. Karr's clergyman
visited her. She told him that she hoped to get the baby back and
would have a year to do so. This clergyman left the hospital and told
the clergyman who worked for the agency what Mrs. Karr had said.
The clergyman who worked for the agency replied that Mrs. Karr could
not get the baby back. Mrs. Karr's clergyman then telephoned Mr.
Karr and told him that his wife was misinformed. At trial, Mr. Karr
testified that he did not tell his wife that she was misinformed because
it would make it easier for her to sign if she didn't know.
26. Id. at 92, 155 N.E.2d at 109.
27. See Comment, supra note 8, at 569.
28. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. Tanzer v. Williams, 502 P.2d 596 (Ore. 1972); Kane v.
United Catholic Social Services of Omaha, Inc., 187 Neb. 467, 191 NW.2d 824 (1971);
In re Adoption of Child by P, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971); and H. CLA,
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 18.4 (1968). But see People ex rel. Scarpetta v.
Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, ap-
peal dismissed, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
29. 30 Ill. App. 2d 371, 174 N.E.2d 987 (1961).
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Ninety-six hours after the birth, the clergyman from the adoption
agency took the consent forms to the hospital for Mrs. Karr's signature.
He did not tell Mrs. Karr about his conversation with her clergyman.
"He testified, however, that he told both parties that the papers were
final and both parties read them, or he read the papers to them."30 Mrs.
Karr testified that she did not remember any discussion about the con-
sent being final.
The trial court refused to set aside Mrs. Karr's consent. The appel-
late court reversed, holding that the knowing failure of the clergyman
and Mr. Karr to correct Mrs. Karr's misunderstanding that she had a
year to get the baby back was sufficiently fraudulent to void her con-
sent:
It is apparent that although she read this surrender or consent and
was told that it was final, she did not know or adequately under-
stand or comprehend the drastic final effect of signing the same.31
As in Buell, the court emphasized that Mrs. Karr was in a weakened
condition at the time she signed the consent.
The reasoning of the court is inconsistent. The court said that the
clergyman did nothing to correct Mrs. Karr's misunderstanding that she
had a year to revoke, but admitted that he explained to her that the
consents were irrevocable. To be guilty of fraud, one must intention-
ally mislead or deceive another. It is difficult to see how the clergy-
man's conduct could be characterized as the cause of Mrs. Karr's mis-
understanding, let alone as intentional deception. A failure to appre-
ciate the irrevocability of a consent to adoption by one making it is not
a statutory ground for revocation. 2
Admittedly, the decision could have rested on the behavior of Mr.
Karr in failing to correct his wife's misinformation, if one were to con-
clude he had a duty to do so. But, instead the court again stretched
the concept of fraud to cover facts not normally within its ambit. The
real basis for the court's decision is suggested by the following state-
ment in the opinion: "The interests and welfare of the child are pre-
sumed to be best served in the custody of the natural parent ... ,
Heubert v. Marshall
The most recent case which set aside a consent to adoption is Heu-
30. Id. at 369, 174 N.E.2d at 901.
31. Id. at 373, 174 N.E.2d at 903.
32. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (1973).
33. People ex rel. Karr v. Weihe, 30 Ill. App. 2d 361, 374, 174 N.E.2d 897, 903(1961)'.
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bert v. Marshall.4 Eight days after the birth of the Marshall's second
child, Sara, Mr. Marshall announced that he was thinking of leaving
Mrs. Marshall and Chicago. Mrs. Marshall testified that she became
hysterical. Three days later, she went to talk to a friend named Julie
Brown. Brown tried to calm Mrs. Marshall, told her that she should
never have had the baby and said that she knew of a couple that would
be good adoptive parents for Sara. At this time, Mrs. Marshall did
not know that her husband and Brown were emotionally involved and
had discussed the possibility of meeting in California. Within a few
days, an attorney representing the potential adoptive parents tele-
phoned Mrs. Marshall to inform her that he had made an appointment
for the Marshalls at the Cook County Department of Public Aid for
the next day. Mr. Marshall was informed by the attorney in a subse-
quent conversation that a 6-month waiting period must elapse before
the adoption became final. However, it seems that the attorney was
referring to the waiting period between placement and final decree,
and not to the period when the consent would become final.
The Marshalls were subsequently interviewed separately by an em-
ployee of the Department for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Both
Marshalls were then taken to the office of another employee for the
execution of their consent to the adoption. This employee explained
the finality of the action before the consent was signed. No alternative
suggestions for dealing with the Marshall's problems were made during
the interview.
The Marshalls subsequently changed their minds and filed a petition
to have their consent set aside. The trial court upheld the consent;
the appellate court reversed. The decision emphasized both the exist-
ence of a fiduciary relationship between Brown and Mrs. Marshall, aris-
ing out of their friendship, and Brown's deceit in telling Mrs. Marshall
that she knew the adopting parents would make good parents when
she actually knew little about them. The court emphasized the speed
at which the adoption was effected, and the weakened physical and
emotional condition of Mrs. Marshall. Finally, the court pointed out
that the adopting parents' attorney had contributed to the Marshalls'
confusion by stating that the adoption would not be final for 6 months. 35
Perhaps in response to the Marshall case, the legislature amended
the Adoption Act in 1973 to provide that the fraud or duress required
for revocation must be on the part of the adopting parents or their
34. 132 Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d at 464 (1971).
35. Id. at 798-99, 270 N.E.2d at 467-68.
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agents or on the part of the person taking the consent. 36  If the Act
as amended had been applied to the Marshall case, Brown's alleged
fraud could not have been used as the basis for' revocation unless
Brown could have been found to be an agent of the adoptive parents.
It is submitted, however, that the outcome of the case would have been
the same regardless of whether the amendment had been applicable.
The judicial bias favoring natural parents over adoptive parents, cou-
pled with the haste and emotional atmosphere surrounding the decision
to consent could have supported a finding that Brown was the adoptive
parents' agent. Alternatively, the court could have found that the con-
duct of the adoptive parents' attorney was fraudulent.
In summary, it appears that the cases voiding consents exhibit a tend-
ency by some judges to broadly apply the concepts of fraud and duress
in order to allow revocation. This tendency may be motivated by a
belief that the relationship between natural parent and child has great
social value and by a desire to exercise discretion in cases where the
judge's sense of justice seems to require it. Finally, while mistake itself
is not a statutory ground for revocation, it is possible that the courts
in Buell, Karr and Marshall were influenced by the contentions that
the consents were executed under mistaken notions of their effect, dur-
ing a period in which the natural parents were subject to physical or
emotional stress.3 7
CONCLUSIONS
The provisions of the Illinois Adoption Act governing revocation of
adoption consents should be modified. A modification could take the
form of: (1) providing that the voiding of consents to adoption is
within the discretion of the court; or (2) changing the procedure for
taking consents to increase the probability that those giving them will
appreciate and understand the significance of their acts.
While the discretionary rule has much to commend it, its practical
application may involve severe, preventable emotional suffering of
either adopting or natural parents. It would seem preferable to con-
tinue the present policy of irrevocability with modifications that would
36. Ill. P.A. 78-854 (1973) Ill. Laws 2616, 2629 amending ch. 4, § 9.1-11.
37. One might conclude that the courts in Karr and Marshall were influenced by
the fact that the children involved were legitimate. While the sample is too small to
safely support a broad generalization, legitimate children were involved in only two of
the six cases denying revocation. See, People ex rel. Filipowski v. Gusterine, 16 111.
App. 2d 336, 148 N.E.2d 1 (1958); Balota v. Handlon, 7 111. App. 2d 178, 129 N.E.2d
234 (1955).
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tend to increase the probability that the persons giving consent appre-
ciate the finality of their actions. At present, the only statutory pro-
visions working in this direction are the requirement that the consent
be taken on a form expressly stating that the consent is irrevocable,
and the provision prohibiting the taking of a consent from a mother
until 72 hours after birth.18  Concomitantly, the Adoption Act could
be modified to prevent courts from granting extra-legal discretionary
revocations under the guise of finding fraud or duress. This could be
done by requiring that the courts apply a narrow statutory definition
of fraud or duress in consent revocation cases.
There are a number of possible ways in which those giving consent
could be impressed with the significance and finality of their actions.
The law could require that consents be given before a judge in court;
the law of Tennessee, for example, requires this formal procedure. 9
However, this procedure has been criticized on the ground that it would
congest court calendars and embarrass unwed mothers.4 ° But there
is no reason for requiring the proceedings to be public, and the con-
gested court problem cannot be solved by keeping matters out of court
that belong there.
A brief cooling-off period between the execution of a consent and
its finalization may also help impress the finality of a consent upon na-
tural parents, by allowing them time to grasp the significance of their
acts. New York law, for example, so provides.4' If there had been
such a cooling-off period in Illinos, the Marshall, Buell and Karr cases
might never have reached the courts. In all three cases, the natural
parents expressed a desire to revoke their consent within a few days
of its execution. Although the adopting parents in those cases would
have suffered some anguish, this anguish would have been slight in
comparison to the anguish they suffered after losing the children fol-
lowing protracted litigation.
Another alternative is to provide for formal, mandatory counseling
of those who propose to consent to the adoption of their children.4
This counseling should stress the finality of the act of consenting and
the available alternatives to adoption.
38. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-9 (1973).
39. TEnN. CODE ANN. § 36-114 (Supp. 1974).
40. See Comment, supra note 8, at 571, and authorities cited therein.
41. N.Y. DoM. RELt L. § 115-b (McKinney Supp. 1972-73); N.Y. Soc. SERV. L. §
384(5) (McKinney Supp. 1972-73). The cooling off period is 30 days.
42. Before accepting consents, agencies often provide prolonged counseling. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 IMI. 2d 84, 213 N.E.2d 507
(1966).
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The Illinois Adoption Act does not contain sufficient safeguards to
assure that parents executing consent to adoption will appreciate the
finality of their acts. Several modifications to the Act have been pro-
posed which might increase the probability that finality will be appre-
ciated: (1) increased formality in the taking of consents; (2) provision
for a cooling-off period; or (3) mandatory counseling for those giving
consent. Of course, other alternatives may be available. But the se-
lection of an alternative or alternatives will not occur unless the legisla-
ture first recognizes that there is a weakness in the consent provisions
of the Adoption Act. The generation by the Act of nine appellate
level cases is at best some indication of such a deficiency.
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